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Abstract:  
This paper investigates whether the degree and the nature of economic and monetary policy 
interdependence between the United States and the euro area have changed with the advent of EMU. 
Using real-time data, it addresses this issue from the perspective of financial markets by analysing the 
effects of monetary policy announcements and macroeconomic news on daily interest rates in the 
United States and the euro area. First, the paper finds that the interdependence of money markets has 
increased strongly around EMU. Although spillover effects from the United States to the euro area 
remain stronger than in the opposite direction, we present evidence that US markets have started 
reacting also to euro area developments since the onset of EMU. Second, beyond these general 
linkages, the paper finds that certain macroeconomic news about the US economy have a large and 
significant effect on euro area money markets, and that these effects have become stronger in recent 
years. Finally, we show that US macroeconomic news have become good leading indicators for 
economic developments in the euro area. This indicates that the higher money market interdependence 
between the United States and the euro area is at least partly explained by the increased real 
integration of the two economies in recent years. 
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Non-technical summary 
There is extensive evidence that monetary policy and macroeconomic news move domestic 
asset prices significantly. Little attention, however, has been given to the question whether 
and why domestic asset prices react to foreign news. The aim of this paper is to help fill 
this gap by analysing the reaction of interest rates in the United States and the euro area to 
domestic as well as to foreign macroeconomic and monetary policy news. With the advent 
of EMU, a new currency area has been created that is much larger and more closed than the 
economies of the single member countries. As a matter of fact, the euro area is similar to 
the US in both size and degree of openness. This could have two effects on the importance 
attached to news by market participants. On the one hand, it could imply that the euro area 
markets are now focusing less on US developments. On the other hand, it could also mean 
that the US markets now react more strongly to developments in the euro area than they did 
to news about individual member countries. 
Analysing and understanding news spillovers across markets allows us to address several 
closely-linked issues. Most importantly, the reaction of domestic asset prices to foreign 
news reflects the degree of financial interdependence between the two markets. The 
analysis of news spillovers, rather than that of co-movements in asset prices, has the 
important advantage of allowing to analyse the question why financial markets are 
interdependent and why the degree of interdependence may evolve over time. In particular, 
the analysis of news spillovers between these two economies over the past 10 years allows 
us to extract important information about the extent and reasons for time-variations in 
financial interdependence. By comparing the interdependence between the US and 
Germany prior to stage 3 of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with the 
situation between the US and the euro area since 1999, this paper tests whether EMU has 
changed the degree and nature of this interdependence.  
In this paper, we look at a broad set of news about macroeconomic variables, as identified 
in the literature on announcement effects, as well as monetary policy news in the United 
States and the euro area. Using daily money market rates for the period 1993-2003, the 
empirical results of the paper suggest that the linkages of money markets have strongly 
increased with EMU. Developments in the euro area markets do generally spill over to the 
US and vice versa. Whereas European markets had been reacting to US developments also 
prior to EMU, the spillover from Europe to the US appears only with the start of EMU. In a 
breakpoint test, we date this increased linkage in June 1998, i.e. at a time when markets   3
were certain that EMU would become a reality. Spillovers from the US to Europe have 
strengthened, similarly around the formation of EMU: breakpoint tests detect this effect in 
May 1999. Our second main result is that beyond this general effect, European markets 
react to certain macroeconomic news about the US economy, namely those regarding retail 
sales, consumer confidence, industrial production and NAPM. Interestingly, these effects of 
individual US news on the euro area money market have generally become significant only 
since the advent of EMU.  
In the third and final step of the analysis, we attempt to shed some light on the question why 
the US and euro area money markets have become so much more interdependent, and in 
particular why some US news have turned into such important determinants of euro area 
interest rates in recent years. We find that the correlation of US macroeconomic 
announcements and corresponding euro area and German announcements have increased 
strongly over the past five years. Since US announcements are almost always released 
before euro area and German announcements, what this suggests is that US announcements 
have developed strong leading indicator properties for the euro area economy over time. 
This indicates that investors may have started in recent years to pay increasing attention to 
US news in order to learn about the prospects of the euro area economy. In short, these 
findings suggests that the higher interdependence of US and euro area money markets in 
recent years may at least in part be explained by the increased real integration of the two 
economies. 
   4
1. Introduction 
There is extensive evidence that monetary policy and macroeconomic news move domestic 
asset prices significantly. Announcements about the state and the prospect of the economy 
and about the stance of monetary policy have an effect on asset prices because they reveal 
information about the determinants of fundamental asset values of stocks, thereby moving 
stock prices (e.g. McQueen and Roley 1993). In money and bond markets, news alter 
interest rates along the yield curve as market participants not only adjust their views about 
the prospects of the economy, but also because they reassess their expectations about the 
reaction of monetary policy to such news. As a result, interest rates have been shown to 
react strongest to macroeconomic news at intermediate maturities as markets expect 
monetary policy to act in the medium-term (Fleming and Remolona 1999a). Similarly, the 
reaction of interest rates to news about monetary policy mirrors the change, or lack of 
change in policy rates, as well as the markets' views about the credibility and effectiveness 
of such a decision (Thornton 1998). Finally, exchange rates have also been shown to 
respond strongly to news about economic fundamentals and monetary policy (e.g. 
Anderson et al. 2003, Faust et al. 2003). 
What most of the growing literature on announcement effects and asset prices shares is a 
focus on the link between domestic asset prices and domestic news. Little attention, 
however, has been given to the question whether and why domestic asset prices react to 
foreign news.
1 The aim of this paper is to help fill this gap by analysing the reaction of 
interest rates in the United States and the euro area to domestic as well as to foreign 
macroeconomic and monetary policy news. Analysing and understanding news spillovers 
across markets allows us to address several closely-linked issues. First, the reaction of 
domestic asset prices to foreign news reflects the degree of financial interdependence 
between the two markets. The analysis of news spillovers, rather than that of co-movements 
in asset prices, has the important advantage of allowing to analyse the question why 
financial markets are interdependent and why the degree of interdependence may evolve 
over time. The strength of news spillovers may result from the elimination of arbitrage 
opportunities, it may be due to the focus of domestic monetary authorities on foreign asset 
                                                           
1 Two exceptions, looking at small open economies, are Gravelle and Moessner (2001), who look at the 
reaction of Canadian interest rates to US news, and Kim and Sheen (2000), who analyse the effect of US news 
on the volatility of Australian interest rates in a static framework. In Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2003), we look 
at the spillovers primarily of monetary policy shocks between the United States and the euro area.   5
prices, or it may reflect the degree of actual and perceived real integration of two 
economies. 
By analysing news effects and spillovers between the United States and the euro area, we 
focus on the two largest economies in the world, and thus on two economies which should 
be relatively less dependent on foreign developments compared to small, open economies. 
In particular, the analysis of news spillovers between these two economies over the past 10 
years allows us to extract important information about the extent and reasons for time-
variations in financial interdependence. By comparing the interdependence between the US 
and Germany prior to stage 3 of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with the 
situation between the US and the euro area since 1999, this paper tests whether EMU has 
changed the degree and nature of this interdependence. With the advent of EMU, a new 
currency area has been created that is much larger and more closed than the economies of 
the single member countries. As a matter of fact, the euro area is similar to the US in both 
size and degree of openness. This could have two effects on the importance attached to 
news by market participants. On the one hand, it could imply that the euro area markets are 
now focusing less on US developments. On the other hand, it could also mean that the US 
markets now react more strongly to developments in the euro area than they did to news 
about individual member countries. 
In this paper, we look at a broad set of news about macroeconomic variables, as identified 
in the literature on announcement effects (see e.g. Fleming and Remolona 1999b), as well 
as monetary policy news in the United States and the euro area. Using daily money market 
rates for the period 1993-2003, the empirical results of the paper suggest that the linkages 
of money markets have strongly increased with EMU. Developments in the euro area 
markets do generally spill over to the US and vice versa. Whereas European markets had 
been reacting to US developments also prior to EMU, the spillover from Europe to the US 
appears only with the start of EMU. In a breakpoint test, we date this increased linkage in 
June 1998, i.e. at a time when markets were certain that EMU would become a reality. 
Spillovers from the US to Europe have strengthened, similarly around the formation of 
EMU: breakpoint tests detect this effect in May 1999. Our second main result is that 
beyond this general effect, European markets react to certain macroeconomic news about 
the US economy, namely those regarding retail sales, consumer confidence, industrial 
production and NAPM. Interestingly, these effects of individual US news on the euro area 
money market have generally become significant only since the advent of EMU.    6
In the third and final step of the analysis, we attempt to shed some light on the question why 
the US and euro area money markets have become so much more interdependent, and in 
particular why some US news have turned into such important determinants of euro area 
interest rates in recent years. We find that the correlation of US macroeconomic 
announcements and corresponding euro area and German announcements have increased 
strongly over the past five years. Since US announcements are almost always released 
before euro area and German announcements, what this suggests is that US announcements 
have developed strong leading indicator properties for the euro area economy over time. 
This indicates that investors may have started in recent years to pay increasing attention to 
US news in order to learn about the prospects of the euro area economy. In short, these 
findings suggests that the higher interdependence of US and euro area money markets in 
recent years may at least in part be explained by the increased real integration of the two 
economies. 
In the remainder of this paper, we proceed by providing a background discussion of key 
issues and the literature of announcement effects on interest rates in section 2. Sections 3 
and 4 describe the data and the econometric model underlying our analysis. The benchmark 
results comparing the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods are reported in section 5. In section 
6, we conduct a detailed analysis of the time variations of news effects and spillovers 
between the US and euro area/German markets, presenting also break tests to date the 
change in the interdependence between the two markets. Moreover, section 6 then attempts 
to explain these variations over time by analysing the correlation of news and the question 
of whether US announcements have developed into leading indicators for economic 
developments in the euro area. Section 7 summarises the results and provides conclusions. 
 
 
2.  Some conceptual issues of news effects 
To what extent monetary policy and macroeconomic news affect asset prices depends on a 
number of factors. To prepare the ground for the empirical analysis, this section provides a 
discussion of some of the key conceptual issues underlying the effects of news. For the 
purpose of this paper, we focus on four issues: the channels of spillovers, the econometric 
identification of news effects, their impact on the yield curve, and the difference between 
mean and volatility effects. 
   7
2.1  News effects and interdependence 
One important issue that has been given little attention in the literature so far is the 
relevance of news spillovers across markets. In principle, there are three channels through 
which foreign announcements may affect domestic markets. First, foreign news may be 
relevant for domestic monetary policy authorities if these target “external” variables, such 
as the exchange rate. Secondly, the integration of global financial markets might lead to 
spillover effects. A change in monetary policy in the United States, for instance, will affect 
other money markets in other countries via capital flows and the elimination of arbitrage 
possibilities. A third channel works through real integration, and implies that foreign 
announcements may reveal relevant information about domestic macroeconomic 
conditions. In this paper, we test for this channel by analysing whether increased real 
integration between the US and euro area economies may account for the higher financial 
interdependence between their money markets. The paper tests whether US announcements 
are good leading indicators for euro area macroeconomic announcements and hence 
whether US news provide information about the economic outlook also of the euro area. 
As to the literature, for interdependence in money markets, Gravelle and Moessner (2001) 
find that Canadian interest rates are strongly influenced by US macroeconomic news but 
only much less by Canadian news. They interpret these findings as reflecting the close 
integration between Canada and the US, but also revealing some market uncertainty about 
the reaction function of Canadian monetary policy. Kim and Sheen (2000) show similar 
results for Australian interest rates, which are found to be strongly affected by US news, in 
particular at the short end of the yield curve. However, none of these papers attempts to 
explain the degree of interdependence through any of the above mentioned channels. 
 
2.2  Econometric identification of news effects 
In order to gauge the extent to which economic fundamentals affect financial markets, it is 
crucial to properly model the arrival of new information. Releases of macroeconomic data, 
or the announcement of monetary policy decisions, are partly expected by the market. This 
expected part of the announcement is thus already priced into the market prior to the 
release. At the point of the announcement, the market reacts merely to the surprise 
component contained in the news, i.e., to the deviation of the announced figures from their 
expected value. Analysing the reaction of markets to surprises in data releases is therefore a 
proxy to assess the importance of the underlying macroeconomic variable for the market.   8
Kuttner (2001), for instance, finds that the announcement of Federal Reserve decisions on 
the Fed funds target rate only affects market interest rates if the decisions are unexpected, 
while the announcement of expected decisions has little or no effect on markets nowadays. 
In this paper, we follow this strategy and investigate the surprise component of 
announcements, although we extend the analysis to include not only monetary policy but 
also news about a broad set of relevant macroeconomic variables. 
 
2.3  News effects and the yield curve 
A widely researched area is the effect of announcements, and in particular of monetary 
policy changes, on the yield curve. For monetary policy decisions, resulting changes at the 
long end of the yield curve can at least in part be attributed to the market’s views on the 
central bank’s credibility or its ability to control inflation. Hence, for instance, a tightening 
of monetary policy can be compatible with a reduction in long-term interest rates if markets 
perceive the tightening as a credible step by monetary authorities to reduce inflation in the 
long run (Thornton, 1998). The effect of a monetary policy decision on long rates can 
therefore be not only quantitatively different but also qualitatively different from that on 
shorter maturities. 
By contrast, for macro announcements a number of papers argue that the effects of news 
surprises at the short and medium maturities mainly reveal information about market 
participants’ beliefs of the central bank’s reaction function (see e.g. Haldane and Read, 
2000). Fleming and Remolona (1999a) find a hump-shaped impact effect of 
macroeconomic announcements on the yield curve in the US, i.e. the largest impact occurs 
at intermediate maturities between one and five years. This can be taken as evidence that 
markets expect monetary policy to react to news in the medium run. Data releases should, 
at least under normal circumstances, not lead to immediate monetary policy reactions. 
However, in the medium run, as more new information accumulates, monetary policy is 
likely to react, which implies that market interest rates at these maturities are affected. 
 
2.4  News effects on market volatility 
The main focus in the announcement literature has been on the effects of news on the 
conditional mean of asset prices. But announcements may also have a significant effect on 
the conditional volatility of asset prices, both before and after announcements. The 
literature on herd behaviour and informational cascades (e.g. Banerjee 1992, Bikchandani   9
et al. 1992) emphasises that what drives financial market outcomes is not so much the 
occurrence of news per se, but how this new information is processed and interpreted by 
market participants. The same news can have a vastly different effect on markets depending 
on the conditions of markets and market participants. For instance, a large degree of 
heterogeneity of expectations about an upcoming announcement may raise trading and 
uncertainty in markets, thereby increasing volatility prior to the announcement It has been 
shown for bond markets (Fleming and Remolona, 1999b) and for foreign exchange markets 
(Galati and Ho, 2001) that an announcement surprise is likely to have a larger effect under 
conditions of market uncertainty. Moreover, Fleming and Remolona (1999b) show that 
volatility in the US bond market peaks just after the release of macroeconomic news. The 
explicit modelling of the conditional second moments allows us to test the volatility 
hypothesis also for money markets.  
 
3. The  data 
3.1  Announcements and surprises 
We look at monetary policy announcements as well as macroeconomic announcements for 
the US, Germany and the euro area during the period January 1993 (January 1999 for the 
euro area) to February 2003. Monetary policy announcements include announcements on 
days of scheduled and unscheduled meetings of the decision-making bodies of the three 
central banks. An important difference across the central banks is the frequency of 
meetings: FOMC meetings take place usually every six weeks, or 8 times per year. By 
contrast, the Zentralbankrat of the Bundesbank and the Governing Council of the ECB have 
been meeting mostly every two weeks, although the ECB announced on 8 November 2001, 
that it would normally take interest rate decisions only at its first meeting of each month. 
This difference in frequency of meetings means that there is a much larger number of 
monetary policy announcements for the Bundesbank and the ECB than for the Federal 
Reserve, although the Fed changed its policy rate somewhat more frequently during the 
1993-2003 period than the Bundesbank and the ECB: 31 changes for the Fed, as compared 
to 13 for the Bundesbank, and 12 for the ECB (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 around here 
   10
As to the macroeconomic announcements, we look at a set of variables for each country 
which have been identified in the literature as the most relevant. The source for the data is 
Money Market Services (MMS) International. Table 2 lists the variables, the usual release 
time during the announcement day, as well as some summary statistics. Figure 1 shows the 
release dates of the macro announcement for month T and reveal that, in general, 
macroeconomic data become available much more quickly in the US than in Germany or 
the euro area. Almost all the US announcements are released within the subsequent month, 
whereas most euro area and German announcements occur with a two-month lag. 
 
Figure 1 and Tables 2 to 4 around here 
 
The expectations data for monetary policy decisions originates from a Reuters poll of 25 to 
30 market participants before each meeting of the central bank decision making bodies. We 
use the mean of the survey as our expectations measure although using the median yields 
similar econometric results.
2 The expectations data for the macro announcements comes 
from MMS and is also based on survey data of market participants. MMS collects the 
forecasts of about 40 money market managers every Friday for the announcements to be 
released during the subsequent week and reports the median of these forecasts. 
Employing standard techniques in the literature (e.g. Gravelle and Moessner, 2001), we test 
for unbiasedness and efficiency of the survey data. We find that the survey expectations are 
of good quality as they prove to be unbiased and efficient (see Tables 3 and 4).  
The expectations data allow us to investigate the predictability of the monetary policy 
decisions. We define a forecast to be correct, or a monetary policy decision to be 
anticipated by the market, if the expectations lie within an interval of 12.5 basis points 
above or below the announced decision. Obviously, the markets anticipate the 
overwhelming majority of interest rate decisions – since in most cases, the decision to leave 
interest rates unchanged was easily anticipated (see first panel of table 1). Looking only at 
the events when the central banks decided to change their policy interest rates (second 
panel of table 1), it turns out that the ECB does somewhat worse than the Fed, but 
considerably better than the Bundesbank: for the ECB, 5 out of 13 changes have been 
                                                           
2 An alternative to this survey data is the use of market instruments, in particular the Fed funds futures rate for 
the US (Kuttner 2001). One reason for our decision to nevertheless choose the survey data was the 
unavailability of a reliable market measure for monetary policy expectations for Germany.   11
anticipated correctly; for the Fed, this has been the case for 23 of the 32 changes, and for 
the Bundesbank for 1 out of 13 changes.  
Finally, we construct the surprise for each variable by deducting the expectation of the 
announcement (Ek,t) from the actual announcement value of the variable (Ak,t). Since the 
unit of measurement differs across variables, we will use in the econometric analysis below 
the standardised surprise (Sk,t), which is obtained by dividing the surprise by the sample 
standard deviation Ωk of each announcement k:
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3.2  Interest rate data 
The market interest rates that we use are interbank rates for Germany and the euro area, and 
treasury bill rates for the US. Following the argument by Fleming and Remolona (1999a) 
that news effects are more clearly identifiable at intermediate maturities, the results 
presented here are for one-year interest rates.
4 For Germany, we take the FIBOR, which is 
then continued by the EURIBOR for the euro area. The closing quotes for both are 
determined at 11:00 Central European Time (CET). For the US Treasury bill market, we 
use quotes that are determined at 17:30 Eastern Standard Time (EST). The time difference 
between EST and CET is usually 6 hours with the exception of one week in late 
March/early April when the difference is 7 hours due to the later transition to daylight 
saving time in the US. One advantage of this timing is that there is no overlap in trading 
times.
5 US announcements therefore affect European markets only on the subsequent 
                                                           
3 The expectations of monetary policy have not been standardised because the coefficients of the monetary 
policy surprises allow a meaningful interpretation without standardisation. 
4 Testing for other maturities proved that the results were robust in terms of their significance. Results 
regarding the effects of monetary policy surprises on rates of different maturities can be found in the working 
paper version of this paper, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002). 
5 Regardless of the choice of timing, it is always possible that events concerning one economy happen outside 
our time window for that economy. Following such an event, we would interpret a reaction of markets to this 
event as a reaction to developments in the other economy (which has potentially reacted in the meantime), and 
thus overstate the interdependence. We opted to minimise this possibility for the US. By choosing the whole 
trading day as our time window for the US, any event that occurs within this time window will correctly be 
attributed as a US reaction to US events. Any US event that occurs after close of trading in the US and to 
which European markets react, will be attributed falsely as linkage from Europe to the US. However, we 
consider this effect to be of minor importance, for two reasons. First, most of the relevant events are likely to 
occur during trading hours in the US. Second, our main finding relates less to the level of interdependence, 
but rather to the fact that interdependence has significantly increased with EMU. We regard it as extremely 
unlikely that with the advent of EMU, more of these post-trading day events occur, and thus attribute our 
finding to an increased linkage, although we cannot exclude the other explanation.   12
business day. European announcements mostly affect European interbank rates on the same 
day. In some cases like the monetary policy announcements in Germany and for the ECB, 
however, announcements occur after 11:00 CET so that the effect on these rates 
materialises only on the following day (see Table 2). Figure 2 shows that the market 
interest rates follow the monetary policy rates closely, especially at the short maturities. 
 
Figure 2 and Table 5 around here 
 
As to the frequency of the analysis, we use a daily frequency rather than intra-day or tick-
by-tick data. The drawback of such an analysis on a lower frequency is that other events 
and news during the day may introduce some noise, thereby possibly making the 
measurement of announcement spillovers less accurate. However, such noise occurs less 
frequently in money markets than in other financial markets. Moreover, an important 
reason for using data on a daily frequency is that the official release times of 
announcements during the day, as given in Table 2, are not always the same as the actual 
release times. There is in particular evidence for Germany that the announcements are 
frequently leaked some time before the official release time. This fact has been given as a 
potential reason by some studies for why there is much less evidence for effects of German 
announcements (e.g. Andersen et al., 2003). The advantage of using data with daily 
frequency is therefore that it allows us to avoid this measurement problem. 
Table 5 shows the summary statistics for the 12-month interest rate series. It reveals strong 
evidence of negative skewness, excess kurtosis, non-normality and serial correlation. The 
econometric model therefore needs to take into account these specific data characteristics. 
 
4. The  econometric  approach 
Following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen et al. (2003), we model the 
processes of interest rate changes in a weighted least square (WLS) framework. This 
methodology takes into account the specific characteristics of the data described in the 
previous section. Moreover, a key advantage of this methodology is that it enables us to 
measure news and spillover effects both for the conditional means and the conditional 
variances. We model the changes in the market interest rates, ∆rt, for the US and 
Germany/euro area (EA) as a function of past interest rate changes in both areas, the set of   13
surprises regarding macroeconomic and monetary policy news in both areas (
EA
i s  and 
US
j s ) 
as well as day-of-the-week effects (Mon, Fri):
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We will refer to (1) and (2) as the mean equations in the remainder of this paper. The 
disturbance terms in (1) and (2) will be heteroskedastic. To take account of this, we apply a 
three-step procedure: in the first step, we estimate equations (1) and (2) via ordinary least 
squares (OLS), and then in the second step estimate the time-varying volatility of  t , 1 ε  and 
t , 2 ε  from the regression residuals,  t , 1 ˆ ε  and  t , 2 ˆ ε . As the third step, the estimates of this 
volatility,  [ ] ( ) t t , 1
2
, 1 ˆ ˆ log exp µ ε −  and  [ ] ( ) t t , 2
2
, 2 ˆ ˆ log exp µ ε − , are then used in the WLS estimation 
of (1) and (2). We iterate on these steps until convergence. The model for the volatility is 
formulated as 
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where the set of surprises regarding macroeconomic and monetary policy news enters in 
form of announcement dummies (
EA
i n  and 
US
j n ), which are unity for those days when an 
                                                           
6 Day-of-the-week effects were also tested for other days, but only the coefficients for the Friday and Monday 
dummies were found to be significant in some specifications. Estimation of these models in an EGARCH 
framework turned out not to be feasible, due to the large dimension of the parameter space: the maximum 
likelihood procedure proved unstable.   14
announcement is made and zero otherwise.
7 All lag lengths (L1 to L4) are chosen according 
to the Schwarz information criterion. 
As explained in Andersen et al. (2003), it is possible to estimate (1) and (2) using 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent standard errors. However, this estimator 
is designed to be robust to residual heteroskedasticity of unknown form, and as such might 
be inferior to estimating a well-specified parametric volatility model in small samples. 
Additionally, this approach yields estimates of equations (3) and (4), which are of interest 
themselves.
8 
 
 
5.  The effects of news on money markets 
Using the framework as set out above, we analyse the response of money markets to news 
for the period prior to EMU, i.e. 1993-1998, as well as for EMU, i.e. 1999-2003, and will 
then compare the respective findings. 
 
5.1   Pre EMU 
For the period prior to EMU, i.e. 1993-1998, results are reported in the left-hand columns 
of Tables 6 and 7.
9 Table 6 displays the results for the German mean and variance equations 
in the left and right panels, table 7 analogously for the US.  
 
Tables 6 and 7 around here 
 
The results for the mean equations show that several macro announcements reveal 
information to the markets. For Germany, news on German consumer prices, M3 and 
unemployment are regarded as important indicators for the future course of monetary 
policy. All variables have the expected sign: unemployment should enter with a negative 
sign, since higher than expected unemployment should eventually lead to a monetary policy 
easing. Interestingly, news on the Ifo index, which is probably the most important German 
sentiment indicator, does not affect interest rates significantly. Monetary policy itself 
                                                           
7 The alternative specification of using absolute announcement surprises yielded quite similar results to that of 
using announcement dummies. 
8 The results are qualitatively robust when using OLS with heteroskedasticity and serial correlation consistent 
standard errors. 
9 The lag lengths for this model were chosen to be 1 for the mean equations (1) and (2), and 2 for the variance 
equations (3) and (4), according to the Schwarz information criterion.   15
strongly affects market rates, even at the one-year maturity, with a monetary tightening 
leading to increased interest rates.  
For the US, we find US consumer prices, non-farm payrolls, industrial production, retail 
sales, as well as the NAPM and consumer confidence indicators to matter for interest rate 
levels. Also here, a monetary tightening increases interest rates. 
Whereas announcements do generally matter in the own country, there is little evidence that 
news spill over to the other country. However, the lag of US interest rates matters for 
German rates the subsequent day. This implies that there has been a general linkage of 
markets: the German market has to some extent followed the developments in the US. On 
top of this general linkage, however, news on specific US variables does not have 
additional consequences for German rates. 
The picture is somewhat different when looking at the variance equations. As for the mean 
equation, volatility in the US is generally transmitted to Germany. However, additionally, 
there are some cases where foreign news can affect the volatility in the home market. For 
example, news on the US NAPM, non-farm payrolls or CPI tend to increase volatility in 
Germany. Interestingly, news on nearly all announcements increases the volatility of 
interest rates. 
 
5.2  EMU 
Repeating the same analysis for the time period 1999-2003 leads to a rather different 
picture.
10 The second columns of each panel in Tables 6 and 7 show results for a model that 
is identical to the one estimated in the previous section. From the estimates for the German 
mean equation, it appears that German news have generally decreased in their importance 
for the euro area market (with the exception of German unemployment). This is not 
surprising, since under EMU, monetary policy is conducted with a view to maintaining 
price stability for the euro area as a whole, such that German variables enter with a smaller 
weight into the decision making of the central bank than before.
11  
More surprisingly, the general linkage as measured by the US lag in the euro area mean 
equation has increased strongly (and significantly, as shown in the third column). 
                                                           
10 We extend German interest rates with euro area rates after January 1999. Regarding the regressors, the 
same is done for the monetary policy decisions, as well as for the news on M3, since the German series is not 
continued after 1998. 
11 Germany accounts for roughly 30% of euro area GDP.   16
Furthermore, several US news are now exerting an additional effect on euro area markets.
12 
This effect is found for NAPM, consumer confidence, retail sales, industrial production and 
US monetary policy, and significantly different from the pre-EMU sample for the first 
three. On the other hand, the parameters in the variance equation are generally estimated to 
be the same as prior to EMU. 
Another change becomes apparent for the US mean equation: developments in the euro area 
are now transmitted to the US markets, as measured by a significant foreign lag. Regarding 
own announcements and the volatility equation, no further changes can be detected when 
comparing the two periods.
13 
 
6  Explaining the changing news effects and market interdependence 
Various findings in the above section call for an explanation: has the loss of explanatory 
power of German announcements been compensated by effects of euro area 
announcements? Why has the general linkage of markets increased and become significant 
for the US? Is this effect related to EMU? Similarly, why do euro area markets respond to 
some US news? What is the role of EMU here? We attempt to find answers to these 
questions in this section by conducting three types of analyses: first, we look at time 
variations in more detail via rolling-window estimations. Second, we formally test for 
changes in market interdependence through structural break tests. And third, we investigate 
whether the increased interdependence over time can be explained by US variables having 
become better leading indicators for euro area and German variables. 
 
6.1  Euro area news and rolling-window estimations 
The lacking effect of German news on the euro area money markets raises the question 
whether news on the euro area have now taken their place. To test this presumption, we re-
estimate our model, replacing the German announcements by a set of euro area news.
14 
However, we allow for an initial period where markets had to learn about the ECB’s 
monetary policy strategy, and estimate the model as of January 2000 on only.
15 The 
                                                           
12 The total effect of these announcements is measured by their effect on the US market multiplied by the US 
lag in the euro area mean equation, plus their direct effect on the euro area mean equation. 
13 The significance of US news in the US mean equation indicates that the lack of significance of German 
news in the euro area mean equation is not due to small-sample problems. 
14 The lag length, according to the Schwarz information criterion, is 1 for both mean equations and the US 
variance equation, and 2 for the euro area variance equation. 
15 This measure of caution is supported by the rolling window analysis below: figure 4 reveals that the effects 
have developed considerably over the initial period.   17
corresponding results are shown in Table 8. As a matter of fact, several of these news 
change euro area rates in a significant way: CPI, industrial production and unemployment. 
 
Table 8 around here 
 
Hence, while news on Germany are discounted by the market, reflecting their decreased 
importance for monetary policy setting, euro area news have filled the gap. At the same 
time, however, US news have become increasingly important. One issue needs to be borne 
in mind here. As discussed above, US announcements are much more timely, i.e. are 
released earlier than the corresponding German, and especially the euro area figures. The 
time delay in announcement can therefore play a role in the importance attached to the 
news by the market. 
To get a first impression of the changes that took place, we repeat the analysis of the 
preceding section using rolling windows. The first window comprises the sample of 
January 1993 to December 1996. Subsequently, this window is moved in monthly steps, 
such that we can estimate the model for 74 windows, with the last one covering a sample 
from March 1999 to February 2003.
16 
Figures 3a to 3b represent the results of these regressions. Each graph contains the 
estimated parameters for one news variable or the foreign lag, with their evolution over the 
74 windows on the x-axis. The parameters are shown with confidence bands that test the 
significance of parameters at the 90% level. 
 
Figures 3a and 3b around here 
 
The parameters estimated for the foreign lag increase strongly, immediately after EMU 
(which is indicated by the vertical line). The increase in importance of US NAPM for euro 
area rates similarly appears to be coincident with EMU, whereas most other changes occur 
at different points in time. The relevance of US consumer confidence, industrial production 
and retail sales becomes apparent only considerably later, for example. 
For comparative purposes, we conducted a rolling-window analysis also for the euro area 
announcements, estimating the models for 24-month windows. Hence, the first window is 
                                                           
16 We chose rolling-window rather than recursive estimation, because the former allows us to better identify 
the time dynamics in the coefficients. Due to the short sample available, the results of a recursive estimation 
place strong weights on the initial periods, which are uninformative if learning processes are present.   18
estimated for January 1999 to December 2000, the last for March 2001 to February 2003. 
All in all, 26 windows are estimated in this fashion. Figures 4a and 4b display the results. 
 
Figures 4a and 4b around here 
 
As suggested earlier in this section, the effects of own news in the euro area have evolved 
somewhat over the estimated sample. This is consistent with the idea that markets first had 
to learn about the ECB’s monetary policy after the formation of EMU. Gaspar et al. (2001) 
provide evidence for learning effects in the money market: looking at overnight rates, they 
find that the markets have adjusted to the changed operational framework within a couple 
of days after January 1
st, 1999. Learning about the operational framework in which banks 
operate is much simpler than learning about the monetary policy reaction function of a 
central bank, though, not least because of the fewer events from which markets can learn. 
We would therefore expect that the market has taken considerably more time to learn about 
the relevant news, a presumption that seems supported by the evidence in figure 4a. 
 
6.2  Detecting structural breaks around EMU 
We interpret the findings of the rolling-window estimations in the previous sub-section that 
some changes - especially the increased general market linkage -  occurred in coincidence 
with EMU, whereas others - especially the increased importance of US news for euro area 
markets - occurred somewhat later. For a formal test, we conducted Andrews-Ploberger 
(1994) tests to identify structural breakpoints. As shown in Table 9, such a breakpoint can 
indeed be detected for various parameters. The estimated break points for the US lag in the 
euro area equation (May 31
st, 1999) and for the euro area lag in the US equation (June 10
th, 
1998) are indeed extremely close to the formation of EMU on January 1
st, 1999. Whereas 
some other breaks are detected prior to EMU, the importance of the US NAPM and 
industrial production for the euro area interest rates have experienced a break in May and 
November 2000.  
 
Table 9 around here 
 
Hence, we do observe that US markets started reacting to the general developments in 
European money markets in close coincidence with the formation of EMU. One possible   19
explanation that comes to mind is related to the fact that through the formation of EMU, a 
single money market was created in Europe that replaced the national markets. As such, 
there is only one market rate that needs to be observed by US market participants in order 
to fully capture the developments in Europe, as opposed to a large number of rates that 
were giving independent and thus potentially conflicting signals prior to EMU. As a US 
market participant, observing the European markets has therefore become much less costly, 
which could explain the closer transmission of interest rate movements. 
 
6.3  Explaining the increased importance of US news 
The analysis above has shown that some US news - in particular NAPM, consumer 
confidence, retail sales, industrial production - have a significant effect on euro area 
markets in addition to the general market linkage. A key finding is that these US news have 
an effect on European markets only after the formation of EMU, but not before. The 
question that we tackle in this final section is therefore to ask why US news have become 
more important for euro area markets in recent years. 
One channel, as discussed in section 2, is that the increased importance of US news for the 
euro area may reflect the higher real integration between the US and euro area economies. 
Higher real integration among the two economies should imply that also macroeconomic 
announcements are more strongly correlated. Since US news are almost always released 
before the corresponding news for the euro area and Germany, US news may therefore 
function now as leading indicators for euro area markets. In other words, this higher 
correlation means that financial market participants do not need to wait any more to the 
same extent for the release of euro area and German announcements in order to learn about 
the state of the euro area economy, but they can nowadays learn about the euro area 
economy ahead of euro area news releases by monitoring US news. This argument is 
consistent with the finding of the previous sections that in particular German 
announcements have become less important over time whereas US news have a larger 
effect on euro area money markets since the advent of EMU. 
To test this hypothesis formally, we conduct a test that US announcements (A
US) anticipate 
German/euro area announcements (A
EA) or expectations (E
EA) by estimating 
 
t
EA
t
US
t
EA
t A A A µ ψ λ ξ + + + = − 1                                                   (5) 
and   20
t
EA
t
US
t
EA
t E A E ω υ π ζ + + + = − 1                                                    (6) 
 
controlling for own past announcements and expectations. 
The parameters of interest are λ  and π , the results for which are presented in Table 10. The 
findings are striking and confirm that US macroeconomic variables have become strong 
leading indicators for euro area and German real economic developments since the advent 
of EMU in 1999. All four US variables (NAPM, consumer confidence, retail sales, 
industrial production) identified above as having a significant effect on euro area money 
markets since 1999 are found to be highly and significantly correlated with industrial 
production and business confidence announcements and expectations in the euro area and 
in Germany since 1999. Importantly, 4 of the 5 US variables analysed did not exhibit these 
leading indicator properties before 1999, but have adopted these properties only in 1999-
2003. Formal testing reveals that the difference in the correlation pre-EMU versus post-
EMU is significantly larger in the latter period for many variables (see column 
"significance" in Table 10).
17 This is consistent with the above findings of the effects of 
these US variables on euro area and German money markets: the spillover effects of these 
variables on the German/euro area money markets became significant only since 1999.
 18 
 
Table 10 around here 
 
Analysing the results in more detail shows moreover that the correlations between US and 
euro area/German announcements and expectations are in some cases large in magnitude. 
For instance, a 1.0 percentage point change in US industrial production is associated with a 
0.908 percentage point change in German industrial production and with a 0.464 percentage 
point change in euro area industrial production in 1999-2003 (see first row of Table 10). 
Other point estimates are more difficult to assess in terms of their magnitude because the 
macroeconomic variables in the US and the euro area/Germany are mostly measured in 
different units. 
                                                           
17 The test for a statistically different effect pre-EMU versus post-EMU for the euro area has been conducted 
by comparing the point estimates of the euro area post-EMU with the estimates of the corresponding German 
variable pre-EMU. To make this comparison valid, euro area announcements and expectations were 
standardised by setting their standard deviations equal to the ones of their German counterparts. 
18 Alternative specifications to equations (5) and (6) were also tested to check for the robustness of the results. 
One of these specifications was to test whether US announcements are correlated with future announcements 
and expectations of German and euro area variables. These correlations were smaller and much less often 
significant, confirming that the contemporaneous correlation tends to be the strongest.   21
In addition to industrial production and business confidence, also the US employment and 
the German and euro area unemployment variables are significantly correlated: higher US 
non-farm payroll employment is associated with lower unemployment in Germany and the 
euro area in 1999-2003. This correlation seems to be stronger between US employment and 
euro area unemployment than between the US and Germany. The increase in the co-
movement between the two variables from 1993-98 to 1999-2003 is statistically significant 
for the euro area unemployment rate at the 5% level. 
A word of caution is in order here. The period 1999-2003 comprises the 2001 recession in 
the US, which has been experienced in a similar fashion in the euro area. As shown by 
Helbling and Bayoumi (2003), business cycle slowdowns are usually highly synchronised 
among the G7 countries, and the recent slowdown has followed this pattern, too. The 
strengthening of the leading indicator properties of US macroeconomic variables therefore 
might in part be explained by this synchronised slowdown. On the one hand, this caveat 
finds support in the fact that the importance of US industrial production and NAPM for the 
euro area money markets shows a structural break in 2000; on the other hand, the recession 
of 2001 constitutes only a small part of the post-EMU sample for which we find these 
strong leading indicator properties. 
In summary, the findings indicate that US macroeconomic variables have developed into 
strong leading indicators of euro area real economic developments since the formation of 
EMU in 1999. This suggests that at least part of the increased interdependence of US and 
euro area money markets, and in particular the additional effects of some US 
macroeconomic variables on euro area financial markets, may be explained by the 
increased real interdependence and integration of the US and euro area economies. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the degree and changing nature of economic and monetary 
policy interdependence between the United States and the euro area from a financial market 
perspective. Specifically, it has analysed the effects of macroeconomic and monetary policy 
news on money market interest rates in the US and Germany prior to EMU, and the US and 
the euro area since 1999. 
This approach has allowed us to address two closely related questions. First, the paper has 
investigated whether EMU changed the degree of financial interdependence between the 
US and the euro area. We find that the euro area and the US have become generally more   22
interdependent over time, and in particular after the advent of EMU. Nevertheless, there is 
evidence that euro area financial markets react more strongly to news in the US than vice 
versa. In addition to the general linkage between the US and euro area money markets, 
there are four US macroeconomic announcements (NAPM, consumer confidence, retail 
sales, industrial production) to which European markets react significantly. In particular, 
we find that the effect of these US news on the euro area have become significant only after 
the formation of EMU in 1999. Conducting formal structural break tests confirms that there 
was indeed a clear structural break for the spillover across markets of many of the 
macroeconomic variables around the advent of EMU. 
The second aim of the paper was to shed some light on the question why the US and euro 
area money markets have become so much more interdependent over time, and in particular 
why euro area markets react to some specific US news since EMU. We find strong 
evidence that US macroeconomic news have become good leading indicators for economic 
developments in the euro area in recent years as euro area and German macroeconomic 
announcements and expectations are highly correlated with corresponding US 
announcements. 
Overall, what the results of the paper suggest is that the US and euro area money markets 
have become significantly more interdependent since EMU, and that this higher financial 
interdependence is at least in part explained by the increased real integration of the US and 
euro area economies in recent years. 
.   23
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics for monetary policy announcements, surveys, and 
surprises 
 
Monetary policy Number of Mean abs. Mean abs. Std. Dev. Mean abs. Std. Dev.
announcements meetings announc.* survey* surprise* "correct" "false" **
Federal Reserve 86 0.137 0.112 0.203 0.048 0.110 72 14
Bundesbank 144 0.040 0.025 0.066 0.044 0.113 127 17
ECB 86 0.055 0.041 0.090 0.046 0.098 76 10
Monetary policy Number of Mean abs. Mean abs. Std. Dev. Mean abs. Std. Dev.
changes changes changes* survey* surprise* "correct" "false" **
Federal Reserve 32 0.367 0.280 0.331 0.107 0.175 23 9
Bundesbank 13 0.442 0.120 0.120 0.322 0.114 1 12
ECB 13 0.365 0.166 0.219 0.199 0.240 5 8
Notes:
*   Means are calculated from the absolute numbers of the announcements, surveys and surprises.
**  A "correct" forecast is defined as an absolute surprise of within +12.5 basis points of the announcement or change.
Source: Federal Reserve, Bundesbank, ECB, Reuters, authors' calculations.
Number of forecasts
Announcement Survey Surprise
Number of forecasts  26
 Table 2: Summary statistics for macroeconomic announcements, surveys, and 
surprises 
 
Usual
Announcement Release Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Euro Area
Harmonised CPI M/M (%) 12:00 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001
Industrial production M/M SA (%) 12:00 0.002 0.008 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.005
M3 Y/Y (%) 10:00 0.061 0.010 0.060 0.011 0.001 0.004
Unemployment rate (%) 12:00 0.091 0.008 0.091 0.008 0.000 0.001
Germany
Ifo Business Climate Index 10:00 94.475 5.307 94.513 5.303 -0.038 0.912
M3 Y/Y (%) 09:30 0.063 0.037 0.060 0.031 0.003 0.015
Unemployment rate (%) 10:00 -0.174 34.663 -3.468 18.520 3.294 26.861
CPI M/M (%) after 11:00 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001
USA
Real GDP (S.A.A.R.)  Advance Y/Y (%) 08:30 0.031 0.017 0.028 0.016 0.003 0.008
Consumer confidence 10:00 108.782 23.251 108.307 22.845 0.475 4.906
CPI M/M (%) 08:30 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001
Industrial production SA M/M (%) 09:15 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.003
N.A.P.M. 10:00 51.848 4.556 52.046 4.306 -0.198 1.949
Nonfarm payrolls 08:30 141.213 172.276 151.291 108.944 -10.078 114.689
Retail sales (%) 08:30 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.000 0.006
Source: MMS, own calculations.
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Table 3: Tests of unbiasedness of expectations 
 
Note: 
Following Gravelle and Moessner (2001), Table 3 shows the results for the test whether the expectations of 
monetary policy announcements are unbiased, based on the following equation: 
 
t k t k t k E A , , , ε β α + + =                                                      (A.1) 
 
The unbiasedness test is a Wald test of the joint hypothesis H0: α=0 and β=1. 
 
Announcement αααα t-stats ββββ t-stats R
2 Wald test p-value # obs.
Euro Area
Monetary policy 0.006 0.560 1.313 11.570 0.615 3.87 [0.025] 86
Harmonised CPI M/M (%) 0.000 0.660 1.092 15.600 0.838 3.110 [0.054] 49
Industrial production M/M SA (%) 0.001 1.170 0.869 6.890 0.497 1.020 [0.367] 50
M3 Y/Y (%) 0.002 1.750 0.963 43.010 0.976 1.590 [0.215] 48
Unemployment rate (%) 0.002 1.230 0.980 71.310 0.991 3.190 [0.051] 50
Germany
Monetary policy -0.015 -1.470 0.988 6.900 0.251 1.190 [0.306] 144
Ifo Business Climate Index 1.289 0.860 0.986 62.240 0.971 0.490 [0.611] 119
M3 Y/Y (%) -0.001 -0.260 1.090 19.800 0.852 3.280 [0.044] 70
Unemployment rate (%) 2.879 1.320 1.014 9.610 0.439 0.970 [0.381] 120
CPI M/M (%) 0.000 -0.620 1.077 16.980 0.713 0.750 [0.473] 118
USA
Monetary policy -0.014 -1.210 1.055 17.960 0.793 1.210 [0.303] 86
Real GDP (S.A.A.R.)  Advance Y/Y (%) 0.004 1.380 0.988 12.070 0.789 3.300 [0.047] 41
Consumer confidence 1.030 0.470 0.995 50.550 0.956 0.600 [0.552] 121
CPI M/M (%) 0.000 -1.940 1.101 11.500 0.527 3.160 [0.046] 121
Industrial production SA M/M (%) 0.000 0.080 1.220 18.270 0.736 6.800 [0.002] 122
N.A.P.M. 2.018 0.940 0.957 23.270 0.819 1.160 [0.316] 122
Nonfarm payrolls -39.756 -2.260 1.196 12.670 0.572 2.640 [0.075] 122
Retail sales (%) -0.001 -1.540 1.294 12.180 0.553 3.830 [0.024] 122
Source: MMS, authors calculations.  28
Table 4: Tests of efficiency of expectations 
 
 
Note: 
The expectations are efficient if forecast errors of monetary policy decisions (Ak,t - Ek,t) cannot be predicted 
systematically on the basis of past announcements: 
 
t k p t k
P
p
p t k t k A E A , ,
1
, , ε ψ ζ + + = − −
= ∑                                            (A.2) 
 
with the lag length usually chosen as P=6. The hypothesis to be tested is ψ1= ψ2=...= ψP=0. 
 
 
Announcement R
2 Wald test p-value # obs.
Euro Area
Monetary policy 0.032 0.430 [0.856] 80
Harmonised CPI M/M (%) 0.156 1.110 [0.377] 43
Industrial production M/M SA (%) 0.232 1.860 [0.114] 44
M3 Y/Y (%) 0.106 0.690 [0.656] 42
Unemployment rate (%) 0.126 0.890 [0.515] 44
Germany
Monetary policy 0.02 0.440 [0.851] 138
Ifo Business Climate Index 0.065 1.220 [0.303] 113
M3 Y/Y (%) 0.110 1.170 [0.335] 64
Unemployment rate (%) 0.080 1.540 [0.171] 114
CPI M/M (%) 0.033 0.600 [0.731] 112
USA
Monetary policy 0.064 0.830 [0.548] 80
Real GDP (S.A.A.R.)  Advance Y/Y (%) 0.178 1.730 [0.168] 37
Consumer confidence 0.028 0.510 [0.801] 115
CPI M/M (%) 0.058 1.110 [0.359] 115
Industrial production SA M/M (%) 0.057 1.100 [0.366] 116
N.A.P.M. 0.042 0.800 [0.568] 116
Nonfarm payrolls 0.023 0.420 [0.864] 116
Retail sales (%) 0.216 5.020 [0.001] 116
Source: MMS, authors calculations.  29
Table 5: Statistical properties of daily interest rate changes 
  Germany  Euro Area  United States 
Mean  -0.003 ***  -0.001   -0.001  
Skewness  0.652 ***  0.268 ***  -0.491 *** 
Excess kurtosis  19.654 ***  11.470 ***  8.072 *** 
Jarque-Bera  25284.445 ***  5900.368 ***  7267.411 *** 
Q(40)  184.882 ***  53.180 *  77.008 *** 
Q
2(40)  68.984 ***  110.273 ***  132.831 *** 
 
Note: 
*/**/*** denotes significance at the 1/5/10% level. Jarque-Bera is the Jarque-Bera test statistic for normality; 
Q(40) is the Ljung-Box test statistic for serial correlation of up to 40
th order; Q
2(40) is the Ljung-Box test 
statistic for the squared interest rate changes.   30
Table 6: Effects of surprises on Germany/euro area, comparison pre-EMU versus post-EMU 
  German/euro area  mean equation  German/euro area  variance equation 
 Pre-EMU 
1993-98 
Post-EMU 
1999-2003 
significance Pre-EMU 
1993-98 
Post-EMU 
1999-2003 
significance
Foreign lag  0.089*** (0.012) 0.305*** (0.023) +++  0.116*** (0.032) 0.088*** (0.025)  
Ger. Mon. Pol.  0.294*** (0.022) 0.387*** (0.042) +++  0.176  (0.330) 0.726**  (0.285)  
Ger. CPI  0.007** (0.003) 0.006 (0.007)   0.240  (0.369) -0.548*  (0.338) + 
Ger. M3  0.024***  (0.007) -0.000 (0.011) +++ 0.479 (0.368) 0.097 (0.332)  
Ger. Unemp.  -0.004*  (0.002) -0.015***  (0.005)   -0.012 (0.422) -0.206 (0.466)  
Ger. Ifo  0.008 (0.015) 0.025 (0.021)   -0.087 (0.370) 0.052 (0.329)  
US Mon. Pol.  0.021 (0.037) 0.081*  (0.047)   0.044 (0.423) 0.029 (0.378)  
US NAPM  -0.001 (0.007) 0.035**  (0.016) ++ 0.713**  (0.361) 0.198 (0.317)  
US Nonf. Payr.  0.003 (0.005) -0.000 (0.008)   0.728*  (0.406) 1.120***  (0.351)  
US Indus. Prod.  0.001 (0.005) 0.016*  (0.010)   0.244 (0.384) -0.396 (0.326)  
US GDP   0.005 (0.012) 0.018 (0.014)   -0.542 (0.608) 0.144 (0.540)  
US Cons. Conf.  -0.002 (0.011) 0.041*  (0.024) +  0.303 (0.373) -0.097 (0.323)  
US Retail Sales  -0.002 (0.009) 0.017***  (0.006) ++ 0.043 (0.367) 0.671**  (0.331)  
US CPI  -0.006 (0.007) -0.008 (0.012)   0.810**  (0.382) 0.021 (0.335)  
 
Notes: 
*/**/***, +/++/+++ denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Numbers in brackets are standard errors.  
“significance” shows whether difference across sub-periods is significant. 
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Table 7: Effects of surprises on United States, comparison pre-EMU versus post-EMU 
  US mean equation  US variance equation 
 Pre-EMU 
1993-98 
Post-EMU 
1999-2003 
significance Pre-EMU 
1993-98 
Post-EMU 
1999-2003 
significance
Foreign lag  0.020 (0.046) 0.184***  (0.042) +++ 0.007 (0.029) 0.046*  (0.024)  
Ger. Mon. Pol.  -0.031 (0.037) -0.024 (0.070)   0.759***  (0.278) 0.373 (0.239)  
Ger. CPI  -0.002 (0.010) -0.006 (0.008)   -0.195 (0.352) 0.212 (0.336)  
Ger. M3  -0.001 (0.015) -0.018 (0.040)   -0.087 (0.349) 0.135 (0.330)  
Ger. Unemp.  -0.003 (0.004) 0.005 (0.011)   -0.020 (0.405) -0.520 (0.464)  
Ger. Ifo  0.009 (0.030) 0.007 (0.028)   -0.067 (0.352) -0.291 (0.326)  
US Mon. Pol.  0.327***  (0.085) 0.169**  (0.085)   0.184 (0.405) 0.413 (0.376)  
US NAPM  0.060*** (0.019) 0.086*** (0.017)   0.164  (0.347) 0.853*** (0.315)  
US Nonf. Payr.  0.079*** (0.016) 0.038**  (0.018)   0.877**  (0.389) 1.439*** (0.348)  
US Indus. Prod.  0.044***  (0.017) 0.011 (0.016)   0.052 (0.369) 0.410 (0.324)  
US GDP   -0.015 (0.038) 0.047 (0.053)   1.440**  (0.585) 0.409 (0.535)  
US Cons. Conf.  0.104***  (0.027) 0.123***  (0.037)   0.294 (0.356) 0.189 (0.324)  
US Retail Sales  0.050** (0.022) 0.024*  (0.013)   0.680*  (0.353) 0.813** (0.326)  
US CPI  0.039* (0.022) 0.002  (0.011)   -0.261  (0.368) 0.839**  (0.332)  
 
Notes: 
*/**/***, +/++/+++ denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Numbers in brackets are standard errors.  
“significance” shows whether difference across sub-periods is significant.   32
Table 8: Effects of surprises on Euro area and US, 2000-2003 
  Euro area   US 
  Mean equation  Variance equation  Mean equation  Variance equation 
Foreign lag  0.304*** (0.028)  0.131*** (0.036)  0.180*** (0.046)  -0.012  (0.035) 
EA Mon. Pol.  0.414*** (0.063)  0.416  (0.391)  -0.100  (0.090)  1.024***  (0.339) 
EA CPI  0.023* (0.012)  0.280  (0.426)  -0.008  (0.015) -0.158  (0.419) 
EA M3  -0.001 (0.016)  0.201 (0.429)  -0.016 (0.022) 0.165  (0.422) 
EA Ind. Prod.  0.013** (0.006)  -0.176 (0.406)  0.013 (0.012) 0.398  (0.415) 
EA Unempl.  -0.027*** (0.008)  -0.207  (0.522)  0.007  (0.014)  0.068  (0.516) 
US Mon. Pol.  0.094 (0.060)  0.582 (0.486)  0.172*  (0.095)  -0.112  (0.480) 
US NAPM  0.014 (0.017)  0.536 (0.423)  0.094***  (0.021) 0.283  (0.419) 
US Nonf. Payr.  0.003 (0.012)  0.713 (0.471)  0.047**  (0.019) 0.516  (0.467) 
US Indus. Prod.  0.037*** (0.012)  0.380  (0.445)  0.003  (0.017)  0.080  (0.444) 
US GDP   0.033 (0.022)  0.028 (0.702)  0.040 (0.053) 1.250*  (0.702) 
US Cons. Conf.  0.043* (0.025)  0.224  (0.434)  0.142***  (0.039)  0.173  (0.427) 
US Retail Sales  0.018** (0.008)  0.373 (0.430)  0.024*  (0.013) 0.640  (0.427) 
US CPI  -0.004 (0.012)  0.128 (0.447)  -0.011 (0.012)  -0.378  (0.448) 
 
Notes: 
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Numbers in brackets are standard errors.  
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Table 9: Andrews-Ploberger (1994) tests for structural breaks in the mean equations 
  Euro area   US 
  Estimated break date  Andrews-Ploberger test  Estimated break date  Andrews-Ploberger test 
Foreign Lag  1999:05:31 13.672***  (0.000)  1998:06:10  2.461**  (0.030) 
Ger. Mon. Pol.  1994:07:15 3.183**  (0.012)  2001:04:11  0.181  (0.830) 
Ger. CPI  1995:06:28 0.883  (0.235)  1996:01:26  0.309  (0.631) 
Ger. M3  2001:07:26 0.750  (0.289)  2001:063:29  0.153  (0.890) 
Ger. Unemp.  2000:04:05 3.565***  (0.007)  1995:08:08  0.339  (0.595) 
Ger. Ifo  2000:11:21 1.228  (0.142)  1997:11:19  0.319  (0.620) 
US Mon. Pol.  1997:05:21 2.863**  (0.018)  1994:09:27  0.565  (0.393) 
US CPI  1998:03:03 2.810**  (0.019)  1994:07:15  0.157  (0.880) 
US Nonf. Payr.  1995:06:05 2.248**  (0.039)  1997:01:10  2.085**  (0.047) 
US Indus. Prod.  2000:11:16 2.963**  (0.016)  1999:06:16  1.020  (0.191) 
US GDP  2001:02:01 0.703  (0.312)  2000:10:27  0.750  (0.289) 
US Retail Sales  2000:03:29 1.289  (0.131)  1995:05:30  0.169  (0.855) 
US NAPM  2000:05:12 1.656*  (0.081)  2001:06:13  1.154  (0.157) 
US Cons. Conf.  1997:06:18 0.173  (0.846)  1999:06:16  1.708*  (0.076) 
 
Notes: 
*/**/*** denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Numbers in brackets are standard errors.  
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Table 10: Co-movements of US announcements with German/euro area announcements and expectations 
Comparison pre-EMU versus post-EMU 
  German/euro area announcements  German/euro area expectations 
 Pre-EMU 
1993-98 
Post-EMU 
1999-2003 
significance Pre-EMU 
1993-98 
Post-EMU 
1999-2003 
significance
US industrial production 
announcement with: 
         
          Ger. industrial production  0.305 (0.506) 0.908*  (0.482)    -0.202  (0.233) 0.812***  (0.223) +++ 
          EA industrial production     0.464*  (0.235)        0.483**  (0.188) +++ 
          Ger. Ifo  47.169 (35.79)  159.064***  (38.08)  ++ 106.631  (62.76) 131.785***  (38.17)   
          EA business confidence     170.086***  (40.13)  ++      136.162***  (27.41)   
US consumer confidence 
announcement with: 
  
          Ger. industrial production  0.012 (0.099) 0.248** (0.119)    0.055 (0.044) 0.166***  (0.057) + 
          EA industrial production     0.169***  (0.059)        0.153***  (0.047)  ++ 
          Ger. Ifo  -7.022 (8.778)  45.018*** (15.26)  ++  18.993  (42.99) 44.567*** (14.11)   
          EA business confidence     71.276***  (10.92) +++      56.866***  (7.924)  ++ 
US NAPM announcement with:    
          Ger. industrial production  0.495 (0.542) 0.748  (0.499)    0.728***  (0.244) 0.872***  (0.248)   
          EA industrial production     0.744***  (0.218)        0.591***  (0.201)   
          Ger. Ifo  170.447*** (37.03)  148.405***  (37.54)    237.012**  (96.88) 159.406*** (34.32)   
          EA business confidence     206.877***  (21.24)        157.311***  (17.85)   
 
Notes: 
*/**/***, +/++/+++ denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 “significance” shows whether difference across sub-periods is significant. For the euro area, the test is vis-à-vis the respective pre-EMU German variable.   35
 
Table 10 (cont.): Co-movements of US announcements with German/euro area announcements and expectations 
Comparison pre-EMU versus post-EMU 
  German/euro area announcements  German/euro area expectations 
 Pre-EMU 
1993-98 
Post-EMU 
1999-2003 
significance Pre-EMU 
1993-98 
Post-EMU 
1999-2003 
significance
US non-farm payroll employment 
announcement with: 
         
          Ger. Industrial production  0.004 (0.015) 0.030** (0.013)    0.001 (0.007) 0.016**  (0.006) + 
          EA industrial production     0.017**  (0.006)        0.016*** (0.005)  ++ 
          Ger. Ifo  0.225 (1.202) 3.783***  (1.224)  ++  -0.102  (2.753) 4.259***  (1.064)  + 
          EA business confidence     4.668***  (1.124) +++      3.628***  (0.775)  + 
          Ger. unemployment  7.000 (25.51)  -36.252*  (18.93)    -15.098  (9.253) -21.116***  (6.201)   
          EA unemployment     -87.585***  (18.46)  ++      -57.684***  (12.85) +++ 
US retail sales announcement with:    
          Ger. Industrial production  0.004 (0.015) 0.030** (0.013)    0.001 (0.007) 0.016**  (0.006) + 
          EA industrial production     0.017**  (0.006)        0.016*** (0.005)  ++ 
          Ger. Ifo  0.225 (1.202) 3.783***  (1.224)  ++  -0.102  (2.753) 4.259***  (1.064)  + 
          EA business confidence     4.668***  (1.124) +++      3.628***  (0.775)  + 
          Ger. retail sales  -0.020 (0.025) 0.025  (0.016)    -0.014  (0.022) 0.019 (0.012)   
          EA retail sales     0.007  (0.005)        0.007*  (0.003)   
 
Notes: 
*/**/***, +/++/+++ denote significance at the 10/5/1% level. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. 
 “significance” shows whether difference across sub-periods is significant. For the euro area, the test is vis-à-vis the respective pre-EMU German variable.   36
Figure 1: Distribution of release days of macroeconomic announcements 
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Figure 2: Monetary policy and market interest rates, 
Germany/euro area and US, 1993-2002 (in %) 
 
 
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
monetary policy rate 1 -month interbank 1-year interbank
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Fed funds target rate 1 -month CD 1 -year T bill  38
Figure 3: Rolling window parameter estimates of (1)-(2) 
Germany and US, January 1993 – February 2003 
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Note: x-axis values correspond to the end point of each rolling window; dotted lines: 90% confidence bands; 
vertical lines represent the start of EMU on January 1
st, 1999   39
Figure 4: Rolling window parameter estimates of (1)-(2) 
Euro Area and US, January 1999 – February 2003 
EA mean equation
Foreign Lag
2001 2002
0.160
0.240
0.320
0.400
EA Monetary Policy
2001 2002
0.000
0.180
0.360
0.540
0.720
EA CPI
2001 2002
-0.020
0.000
0.020
0.040
0.060
EA M3
2001 2002
-0.040
0.000
0.040
0.080
EA Industrial Production
2001 2002
-0.040
-0.020
0.000
0.020
0.040
EA Unemployment
2001 2002
-0.048
-0.032
-0.016
0.000
0.016
US Monetary Policy
2001 2002
-0.160
0.000
0.160
0.320
US N.A.P.M.
2001 2002
-0.030
0.000
0.030
0.060
0.090
US Nonfarm Payrolls
2001 2002
-0.036
-0.018
0.000
0.018
0.036
US Industrial Production
2001 2002
-0.030
0.000
0.030
0.060
0.090
US GDP
2001 2002
-0.050
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
US Consumer Confidence
2001 2002
-0.080
0.000
0.080
0.160
0.240
US Retail Sales
2001 2002
-0.040
0.000
0.040
0.080
US CPI
2001 2002
-0.060
-0.030
0.000
0.030
0.060
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Note: x-axis values correspond to the end point of each rolling window; dotted lines: 90% confidence bands CFS Working Paper Series: 
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